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HABEAS CORPUS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
O'Neal Smalls*
In 1970 Congress enacted the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act.' The Act was designed to streamline the District's
historically cumbersome and inefficient court system.2 Part of that broad re-
form included the adoption of a provision, now section 23-110 of the District
of Columbia Code,3 which detailed the procedures by which prisoners under
* Associate Professor of Law, American University. S.B., Tuskeegee, 1964; J.D.,
Harvard, 1967.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-358, revising and amending Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-241 (codified at D.C. CODE tit. 11 (1973)).
2. For a detailed discussion of the entire Act, see Rauh & Silbert, Criminal Law
and Procedure: D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 20 AM. U.L.
REv. 252 (1971).
3. 84 Stat. 609 (1970), D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-110 (1973) provides:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in vio-
lation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of
Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3)
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sen-
tence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court to vacate,
set aside, or correct the sentence.
(b) A motion for relief may be made at any time.
(c) Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds (1) the judgment was rendered without juris-
diction, (2) the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise
open to collateral attack, (3) there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner, resentence him, grant a new trial, or correct the sen-
tence, as may appear appropriate.
(d) A court may entertain and determine the motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
(e) The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive mo-
tion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
(f) An appeal may be taken to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application
for a writ of habeas corpus.
(g) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
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custody of the local D.C. courts could collaterally attack their sentences. This
article will analyze section 23-110, consider the constitutional questions it
raises concerning the suspension of -the writ of habeas corpus4 in the District
of Columbia and the proper role of article III courts with respect to the writ
in the District's revamped court system, and will conclude with a suggested
interpretation of section 23-110 which would avoid impairment of the writ
and subsequent constitutional difficulties.
Before detailing the procedures outlined in section 23-110, it is necessary
to describe at least briefly the D.C. court system under the 1970 reorgani-
zation. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia was created as the
trial court of general jurisdiction. Its decisions are reviewable only by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District's highest court. The
Court of Appeals' decisions are subject to review only by the United States
Supreme Court in accordance with ,the usual certiorari procedures. 5 Although
Congress may establish courts under either its article I or article III powers,6
the legislative history of the Act 7 makes clear that Congress was exercising
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not
be entertained by the Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it ap-
pears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under this sec-
tion or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
6. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). In Palmore, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that only upon courts established under article III has juris-
diction been conferred over felony prosecutions arising under a federal law. For
a discussion of the contention that article III "is the complete catalog of federal
judicial power," see 1 J. MOORE, FEDERA. PRACTICE 10 .4[4], at 71 (2d ed. 1953).
The distinction between article I and article III courts and the attendant constitutional
questions have been analyzed frequently by judges and commentators. See Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, 320 U.S. 530 (1962), overruling Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 289 U.S. 438
(1929) and Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); National Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 605 (1949); Rathvon & Keeffe, Washingtonians
and Roumanians, 27 NEB. L. Rav. 375 (1948); Watson, The Concept of the Legislative
Court: A Constitutional Fiction, 10 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 799 (1942); Williams, District
of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEo. L.J. 477, 491-92 (1971); Note, The
Distinction Between Legislative and Judicial Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assign-
ment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 133 (1962).
7. H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970):
This title makes clear that the District of Columbia courts . . . are Article I
courts, created pursuant to Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 of the United States Constitu-
tion, and not Article III courts. The authority under which the local courts
are established has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the Supreme
[Vol. 24:75
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its article I powers when it created the Superior Court and the Court of Ap-
peals, pursuant to its plenary authority over the District of Columbia.8
Section 23-110 allows a prisoner under sentence of the Superior Court to
file a motion to have the sentence vacated, set aside or corrected. It further
states that this collateral attack 'by motion precludes the prisoner's filing for
a writ of habeas corpus in any federal court unless he can show that the
remedy by motion in the Superior Court is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention. Given the constitutional prohibition against sus-
pension of the writ, the section needs close examination to determine its con-
stitutionality.
I. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus has been described as "the most celebrated writ
in the English Law." The power to issue the writ was given to federal courts
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first congressional grant of judicial powers. 10
While granting the power to issue the writ, the Act did not define the pur-
poses for which the writ could be used, and the courts turned to the common
law principles which governed the writ in order ;to define its scope."I
That scope has undergone a long process of development and expansion.
The earliest view restricted use of the writ to situations in which the sentenc-
ing court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or person of the pris-
oner.12 There followed a period in which quite suspect legal fictions were
Court of the United States has not declared the local system to be either Arti-
cle I or Article III courts; decisions having indicated that the District of Co-
lumbia courts are, in this respect, both fish and fowl. This expression of the
intent of Congress clarifies the status of the local courts.
See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), noted in 23 CATH. U.L. REV.
195 (1973).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. It has long been established that Congress may
exercise within the District all legislative powers that a state legislature may exert within
its state, and may vest and distribute the judicial power among courts, and regulate ju-
dicial proceedings before them as it thinks fit, so long as its action does not contravene
any provision of the Constitution. See Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5
('1899).
9. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
11. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). For a detailed analysis of the common law writ,
see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *129-30; 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1938). The historical development of the writ in the United
States is summarized in Developments in the Law-Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1042-72 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822). The Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia had held Kearney in contempt and imprisoned him for re-
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employed to bring particular facts within the lack-of-jurisdiction standard.'8
This expansion of the writ culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Allen,14 in which ;the Court ruled that all federal constitutional
questions could be raised in habeas corpus petitions, not simply questions re-
garding the sentencing court's jurisdiction. 15  So today it is well settled
that federal courts have the power to restore liberty to any person within their
jurisdictions held in custody in violation of the Constitution or any law of
the United States. 'Unlike appellate review, where the question is whether
the judgment is legal or proper, on habeas corpus the question is the deten-
tion simpliciter-the lawfulness of the detention itself. As expressed by Jus-
tice Brennan, the root principle is that
in a civilized society, government must always be accountable ito
the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment can-
not be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of
law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. 16
II. LEGISLATIVE PROVISION FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
Section 23-110 appears to require a prisoner sentenced by the Superior
Court to apply for post-conviction relief by motion in that court, and
would seem to prevent such prisoner from seeking habeas corpus relief in
any federal court unless he can show that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective. Despite its impact on the scope of habeas corpus relief, .there
fusing to answer a question which he thought would tend to incriminate him. Kearney
argued that the Supreme Court had the "power to issue the writ of habeas corpus in
every case where the personal liberty of the citizen is restrained under the judicial au-
thority of the union." Id. at 39. Justice Story posited two questions raised by the case:
first, whether the Supreme Court has authority to issue the writ where a person is being
detained by order of any other federal court; and second, if that power does reside in
the Court, whether Kearney's case was one in which it could be properly exercised. Id.
at 41. Story wrote that it was established that the answer to the first question was in
the affirmative, but that equally well established was the principle that the Supreme
Court had no authority to consider a writ of error to overturn a criminal conviction at-
tained in a court of competent jurisdiction. Since the lower court's finding of contempt
was in effect a conviction, the Court held it was powerless to review the adjudication.
Id. at 42-43.
13. An excellent example of the approach taken by the federal courts to circumvent
the lack-of-jurisdiction requirement is Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), in which
the court entertained the writ under the theory that a trial court has no jurisdiction over
a defendant denied assistance of counsel.
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
15. Mr. Justice Reed stated that federal district courts "have the power . . . to hold
hearings on the merits, facts or law a second time when [they are not] satisfied that
federal constitutional rights have been protected." Id. at 464 (dictum).
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
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was little discussion of this section in the legislative history of the Act. The
Senate Report simply states:
Section 23-110 is new. Rather than relying on the inherent power
of the Superior Court to review judgments of conviction, the new
section provides statutory procedures for post conviction challenges.
Section 23-110 is modeled upon 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with only the
necessary technical changes. 1
7
An analysis of section 23-110 must, therefore, start with a review of 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
A. The Federal Counterpart
Section 2255 requires a prisoner under sentence of a federal court to seek
post-conviction release in the court which sentenced him, through a motion
to have the sentence vacated, set aside or corrected. The section applies only
to federal prisoners and substitutes one federal court, the sentencing court,
for another federal court, the one which has jurisdiction over the custodian
of -the prisoner or movant. Since a section 2255 motion, in the ordinary case,
offers a fully equivalent substantive hearing in a federal court,' 8 the section
prohibits use of the writ of habeas corpus where it "appears ,that the applicant
has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him,
or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the rem-
edy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten-
tion." This language is nearly identical with that of section 23-110 of the
D.C. Code. These two sections are in contrast to the general habeas corpus
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, under which federal judges in the jurisdiction
where the prisoner is detained may entertain the writ of habeas corpus.
The legislative history of section 2255 indicates that it was designed to
remedy a specific problem. In 1944 the Judicial Conference of the United
States submitted two bills to Congress. The "judicial bill," upon which sec-
tion 2255 is patterned, would have required federal prisoners to apply by
motion in the sentencing court for post-conviction relief instead of making ap-
plication for habeas corpus in the district in which .they were confined.' 9 The
Judicial Conference was concerned with the inordinate number of habeas
corpus petitions entertained by federal judges in districts in which major fed-
eral penal institutions were located. Additionally, habeas corpus petitions
17. S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1969). The House Report is to
the same effect. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1970).
18. The Supreme Court made clear that the section 2255 motion is the full equivalent
of a habeas corpus petition for federal prisoners in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205 (1952). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
19. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 22 (1944).
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were being reviewed and hearings conducted far from the scene of the facts,
witnesses and records. For example, in Walker v. Johnston20 the petitioner,
imprisoned in California, alleged ithat he was denied counsel and -that his
guilty plea was coerced by the United States Attorney, 'his assistant and a
deputy marshal, all matters allegedly occurring in the Northern District of
Texas. The court on habeas corpus granted an evidentiary hearing in Cali-
ornia. Situations like this obviously worked a hardship on the federal system.
Moreover, many habeas corpus claims were frivolous, yet federal judges had
difficulty disposing of them because the petitions were filed in the districts
of confinement, while the relevant records were in the sentencing courts and
not readily available. Thus, at the insistence of the Judicial Conference,
Congress enacted section 2255 to meet the practical difficulties that had
arisen in administering habeas corpus jurisdiction. One federal court was
simply substituted for another. Nowhere in section 2255 can one find any
purpose to impinge upon a prisoner's right of habeas corpus. The sole pur-
pose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings
by affording the same rights in a more convenient forum. 21 The legislative
history of section 2255 confirms this view.22
B. D.C. Code § 23-110
This brief history would suggest that the rationale behind section 2255 is
entirely inapplicable to section 23-110. The mischief which gave birth to sec-
tion 2255 was simply not a problem confronting the Congress which enacted
section 23-110. The burden on the federal district court in the District of
Columbia or district courts in neighboring states from habeas corpus petitions
filed by prisoners convicted in the Superior Court would seem to be no greater
than the burden on any other federal district court which entertains petitions
from state prisoners. Moreover, the difficulties which the district court would
experience in obtaining records, witnesses and other evidence with respect
to prisoners sentenced by the Superior Court would seem to be no greater than
those experienced by other federal district courts when reviewing petitions
from state prisoners. Thus, while the language of section 23-110 is patterned
after that of section 2255, its rationale must be found elsewhere.
It cannot be contended that Congress intended to deprive persons in cus-
20. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
21. This was also the view of Judge Parker, Chairman of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Habeas Corpus, the bill's drafter. See 8 F.R.D. 171, 175 (1948).
22. "This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the
ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for correcting er-
roneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus." H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong.,
Ist Sess, A 180 (1947).
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tody under sentence of the Superior Court of their right to habeas corpus.
Neither the Act's legislative history nor its language compels such a conclu-
sion. Nevertheless, section 23-110 can -be read as barring habeas corpus in
the sense that it may be extremely difficult for prisoners to show that the
motion procedure is inadequate or ineffective for purposes of testing the de-
tention's lawfulness. However, this would not be a habeas corpus remedy.
Put another way, section 23-110 seems to assume that the motion procedure
will be both an adequate and effective way to test the legality of a deten-
tion, and only in the extraordinary case will a prisoner be permitted to resort
to habeas corpus. If we accept this implicit assumption, then, as a practical
matter, local prisoners will not be permitted to resort to federal habeas
corpus. This reading would seem to raise constitutional questions regarding
suspension of the writ. If another interpretation would avoid the constitu-
tional question, that interpretation should be accepted.23
It could be argued that the aforementioned interpretation does not raise
constitutional problems because the Superior Court, like the federal district
court, may entertain motions for habeas corpus, and a section 23-110 motion
in effect is a habeas corpus proceeding. Prior to 1970, it was relatively clear
that Congress had not authorized local District of Columbia courts to enter-
tain writs of habeas corpus. Congress had then authorized only the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to entertain habeas corpus
petitions for any person "committed, detained, confined or restrained from
his lawful liberty within the District, under any color or pretense whatever.
S. ."24 Moreover, over a century and a half ago the Supreme Court, per
Chief Justice Marshall, held that jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
was not an inherent judicial power and must be explicitly conferred by
statute.
25
However, there have been suggestions that the local District of Columbia
23. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); Silver v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-901 (1961). In full, the statute read:
Any person committed, detained, confined or restrained from his lawful liberty
within the District, under any color or pretense whatever, or any person in his
or her behalf, may apply by petition to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, or any judge thereof, for a writ of habeas corpus,
to the end that the cause of such commitment, detainer, confinement, or re-
straint may be inquired into; and the court or the judge applied to, if the facts
set forth in the petition make a prima facie case, shall forthwith grant such
writ, directed to the officer or other person in whose custody or keeping the
party so detained shall be, returnable forthwith before said court or judge.
25. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). See Ex parte Mce-
Cardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1868); Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103,
105 (1845).
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courts had the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus. One case often cited
for that proposition is Morrow v. District of Columbia.26  While the language
of the decision is broad and purports to cover all extraordinary writs, the
question before the court was a narrow one-whether the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals had authority to issue writs of prohibition and manda-
mus. The circuit court held that ,the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
had inherent power, as well as authority under ,the All Writs Act, 27 to is-
sue writs of prohibition and mandamus. If the court was correct in treating
all extraordinary writs alike, then Morrow is at odds with the Supreme
Court's view that habeas corpus jurisdiction must be explicitly conferred by
statute. Whether the language of the All Writs Act, "all courts estab-
lished by Act of Congress," includes local District of Columbia courts, is not
free of doubt.28 However, even if we assume that there are substantial rea-
sons for finding that the local courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of pro-
hibition and mandamus, 29 it does not follow that they must likewise have au-
thority to issue writs of habeas corpus. These several writs have very dif-
ferent histories, and they serve very different purposes. The local courts may
well need the power to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus in order to
protect their jurisdiction, effectuate their judgments, or perform other duties
assigned to them by law. In no meaningful sense can it be said that the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus is similarly necessary or essential to
the courts' jurisdiction. So long as the local courts have the authority to
vacate and modify judgments, their legitimate interests are adequately pro-
tected.
If section 23-110 is read carelessly, serious questions regarding suspension
26. 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970): "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
diction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
28. In Burke v. United States, 103 A.2d 347 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954), the court held
that the words "all courts established by Act of Congress" in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 did not
include the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia. The court reasoned that the
history of section 2255 did not show that Congress intended to include local courts. Sec-
tion 2255's predecessor defined "courts of the United States" as courts created by acts
of Congress whose judges hold offices during good behavior, i.e. article III courts. See
28 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. V 1952).
29. In Mike's Mfg. Co. v. Zimzoris, 66 A.2d 414 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949), the court
held that it had implied or inherent power to issue writs of prohibition in aid of its ap-
pellate jurisdiction. But here again it is unclear how the court would have responded
had it been confronted with all of the specific considerations applicable to habeas corpus.
In Zimzoris, use of the writ of prohibition was merely an indirect way of setting aside
a judgment which the court would have vacated under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure had the time for vacating a judgment not expired,
[Vol. 24:75
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of the writ will arise. At least one federal court expressed strong doubt re-
garding the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a statute which merely
substitutes one article III court for another.8 0 It seems entirely appropriate
to remain vigilant in preventing any impairment of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, " 'there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired,' and un-
suspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution."' '  "Any
statute which might tend to weaken the efficiency [of the writ] or delay its
availability or make its use more difficult should be carefully considered and
construed liberally in the light of [the writ's] history and its benign pur-
poses.
' '82
If section 23-110 is read to prevent resort to federal courts except where
it is shown that the motion procedure is ineffective or inadequate, then in
the great majority of the cases involving local D.C. court prisoners review
by an article III court will lie only by writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. 8  Professor Paul A. Freund has pointed out that there are
deficiencies in relying solely on direct review by the Supreme Court of state
criminal convictions.3 4  First, the issue of alleged constitutional irregularity
is often not disclosed in the record of the trial. Second, state post-conviction
review may not be available; and even if such a review is available, the
record may be unclear. Third, since certiorari is discretionary, the Supreme
Court only takes cases of general importance and will not grant review merely
to correct errors in cases.8 5 Moreover, it cannot be stressed too strongly that
the determination of the constitutional claims may turn wholly on the facts.
It follows that if a prisoner is to have his constitutional claims fully and fairly
considered by a federal court, there must be an opportunity for fact-finding
by a federal article III court.
3 6
30. Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, 465 (9th Cir. 1950), vacated, 342
U.S. 205 (1952).
31. Smith v. Bennet, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961), quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S.
19, 26 (1939).
32. St. Clair v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585, 586 (N.D. Ga. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1948). See also Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 605, 617; Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 11, at
1272-74.
33. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-102 (1973).
34. Freund, Symposium-Habeas Corpus, Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REV. 18,
27-30 (1964).
35. Id. at 28.
36. Cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908) (Holmes, J.):
Whether their property was taken unconstitutionally depends upon the valua-
tion of the property, the income to be derived from the proposed rate and the
proportion between the two-pure matters of fact. When those are settled the
law is tolerable plain. All their constitutional rights, we repeat, depend upon
1974]
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In no meaningful sense can one view Supreme Court review of a District
of Columbia conviction as the equivalent of habeas corpus. The power of
inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary.8 7 If a federal court is unavail-
able to conduct an evidentiary hearing and try -the facts de novo where a
prisoner 'alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, 'then it
would seem that the writ has been suspended in violation of our Constitution.
The whole history of the writ-its unique development-re-
futes a construction of -the federal courts' habeas corpus powers
that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate re-
view. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an
original civil proceeding, independent of .the normal channels or re-
view of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations. State
prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon
proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of
the person, safeguarded against state action by the Federal Consti-
tution. Simply because detention so obtained is intolerable, the
opportunity for redress, which presupposes the opportunity to be
heard, to argue and present evidence, must never be totally fore-
closed 88
III. THE FEDERAL COURT/STATE COURT DISTINCTION
IN HABEAS CORPUS ANALYSIS
It seems reasonably clear that in creating the Superior Court and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, Congress intended to create a local and
independent court system comparable to that in the states.8 9 This is reflected
in the appellate40 and removal procedures 41 for local courts. Judges of the
local courts are not article III judges ;42 they serve only for a term of fifteen
years, not life, 43 they may be removed from office for a number of reasons 44
what the facts are found to be. They are not forbidden to try those facts be-
fore a court of -their own choosing if otherwise competent.
37. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
38. Id. at 311.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 34-35 (1970); S. REP. No.
91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 18 (1969); Hearings on S. 1066, S. 1214, S. 1215, S.
1711 and S. 2601 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia and Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 3, at 1140, 1149 (1969).
40. See D.C. Cone ANN. § 11-103 (1973).
41. See id. § 11-503. Cases are removable from Superior Court to federal district
court in the same manner as from state courts.
42. Id. § 11-101.
43. Id. § 11-1502.
44. Id. § 11-1526. A judge can be removed upon his conviction of a felony, for will-
ful misconduct in office, or for persistent failure to perform official duties. A judge can
[Vol. 24:75
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and there is no prohibition against reduction of their salaries as there is with
article III courts. 45  The courts are local courts and the judges are local
judges; there is no reason to assume that they are federal judges in the article
III sense. Indeed, Congress intended otherwise; local courts should no more
ignore their statutory origin and history -than should state courts discharge the
constitutional responsibilities of article III courts. The history of the Act,
its language, and experience with the local courts indicate that the District
of Columbia Superior Court and Court of Appeals should be treated, at least
for habeas corpus purposes, as state courts, subject to the provincial outlook
to which such courts stand heir. This is simply a recognition of what has
been known throughout our history-manifested by the provision for federal
courts with diversity jurisdiction-that states often use varying and unequal
weights to measure local concerns against constitutional claims.
-In -terms of ultimate responsibility, then, the protection of fundamental con-
stitutional rights was entrusted to article III courts. The history of this con-
cept is too well known to repeat at length here. 46  The Founding Fathers
wrote into article III of the Constitution requirements that would insure judi-
cial independence and ability to protect constitutional rights, even in the face
of strong public opposition. Surely habeas corpus is one of those rights. All
habeas corpus statutes have been written in terms of federal article III
courts. 47 Indeed, in Holiday v. Johnston,48 the Supreme Court held that
the "plain mandate of the statute" requires that a habeas corpus petition be
heard by a federal judge and therefore the case could not be referred to a
commissioner for findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended dis-
position. Modem habeas corpus jurisdiction is an institutional device for the
supervision of the enforcement of constitutional rights. It rests on the dual
premises of the need for separate proceedings to ensure that individual rights
are protected and the need for a constitutional court to decide constitutional
claims to ensure that federal rights are uniformly and fully vindicated. 49 In
Brown v. Allen,5" it was held that all federal constitutional questions raised
by a state prisoner in a federal habeas petition were cognizable-even
be involuntarily retired if he suffers from a physical or mental disability which inter-
feres with the performance of his duties.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. Ell, § 1.
46. See generally 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
455-97 (rev. ed. 1937).
47. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73; Judiciary Act of February
5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1970).
48. 313 U.S. 341 (1941).
49. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 11, at
1060-62.
50. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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those questions which have been adjudicated fully in the state court.
,[N]o binding weight is to be attached to the state determination.
The congressional requirement is greater. The state cannot have
the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what proce-
durally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal
constitutional right.51
As one distinguished commentator has stated: "[P]erhaps [Brown] can be
both explained and justified as resting on the principle that a state prisoner
ought to have an opportunity for a hearing on a federal constitutional claim
in a federal constitutional court, and that, if the Supreme Court in its discre-
tion denies this opportunity on petition for certiorari, it ought to be available
on habeas corpus in federal district court.15 2
Moreover, persons convicted in article III courts are entitled to a full and
fair habeas corpus proceeding. "There is no reason to treat federal trial er-
rors as less destructive of constitutional guarantees than state trial errors, nor
give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants
than to similar defaults by state defendants." 5' Perhaps even more instructive
is that even military prisoners enjoy the right to habeas corpus in an article
III court, notwithstanding the fact that the scope of review of military deten-
tions is to some extent 'limited.5 4 Congress, under its plenary authority over
the military, 55 'has taken great care in providing a complete system of review
within the military for the protection of constitutional rights. Yet it is clear
today that military prisoners have the right to petition article III courts for
writs of habeas corpus. 56 It seems clear that there can be no compelling rea-
son for depriving residents of the District of Columbia of the right to the
"great writ" in an article III court.57
51. Id. at 508 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
52. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106-07 (1959).
53. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969).
54. See generally 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 416 (1974).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
56. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). This is so despite the language of 10
U.S.C. § 876 (1970) that military criminal proceedings shall be "final and conclusive"
and "binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States."
57. In Bland v. Rogers, 332 F. Supp. 989 (D.D.C. 1971), the court said that section
23-110 "extinguishes the traditional authority of the federal courts to review local judi-
cial actions by the issuance of writs of habeas corpus." Id. at 991. This comment can
only be viewed as dictum. The petitioner had been indicted in federal district court and
thereafter filed a motion in Superior Court to challenge the constitutionality of both
the condition of his confinement and the statute under which he was indicted. The
Superior Court dismissed the motion without prejudice to its being brought in federal
court. Section 23-110 was inapplicable in that proceeding since there was no prisoner
"in custody under sentence of the Superior Court." Moreover, the petitioner had been
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It is undoubtedly true that Congress has considerable discretion in deter-
mining the jurisdiction of federal courts58 and it is also true that, as stated
in Palmore v. United States,5 9 "neither this Court nor Congress has read the
Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under federal law, or
even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried
in an Article III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection
against salary reduction. '60 But cases expressing these views ought not to
be read for more than they really say. It is important ,to note, for example,
that in Sheldon v. Sill6' the statement regarding the power of Congress to
determine the jurisdiction of federal courts was made in the context of a di-
versity case. Within the context of federal jurisdiction, one could quite ra-
tionally treat federal question and diversity cases differently. And, equally
important, in the famous case of Ex parte McCardle,62 the Supreme Court
upheld an act of Congress which withdrew the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in habeas corpus cases included under the Act of 1867. This
case has long been read as giving Congress full control over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. 63  Here -again, one could rationally treat ques-
tions regarding jurisdiction of inferior courts and that of -the Supreme Court
differently. Moreover, less than a year after McCardle, the Supreme Court
held that it could still issue original writs of habeas corpus and review a case
like McCardle's by certiorari.6 4 The point is that McCardle 'barred only one
method of review in the Supreme Court. In that very case other avenues
of review by the Court were opened. While the power of Congress
to grant, withhold and distribute the judicial powers of the United States
is undoubtedly plenary, it is not absolute and unlimited; Congress may not
violate the Constitution or impair our constitutional scheme. And the state-
ment quoted above from Palmore should be read in its proper context. In
Palmore, the Court was only concerned with the power of Congress to require
residents of 'the District of Columbia to 'be "tried" in article I courts, and did
not address itself to the habeas corpus issue. Prisoners convicted in those
very forums65 identified by the Supreme Court to illustrate its point may seek
indicted in federal court and motion procedures and perhaps habeas corpus were avail-
able to challenge the federal indictment and condition of pretrial confinement.
58. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
59. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
60. Id. at 407.
61. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
62. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
63. See, e.g., C.A. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (2d ed. 1970).
64. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
65. E.g., state courts, territorial courts or military courts. See 411 U.S. at 402-04.
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habeas corpus relief in article I1 courts. Thus, Palmore does not answer
the question at hand.
The legislative history of the 1970 Act makes clear -that Congress was con-
cerned about the workload of the local federal district court:
The burden is acute in the District of Columbia, the seat of the
Federal Government, where, in the absence of inordinately
crowded dockets (both civil and criminal), a substantial and
greater quantum of genuinely Federal litigation might best and
conveniently be brought. Yet, at the present the median time for
civil jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
is nearly double the median for Federal district courts nation-wide.
In recent years as many as 12 out of 14 judges of the Federal
court in the National Capital have been assigned full time to -the
trial of local felony offenses.06
The congressional solution to the inordinate number of cases being tried in
the District of Columbia's federal district court was to consolidate the local
trial courts into a new court of general local jurisdiction-the Superior
Court,17 with both criminal68 and civil 9 jurisdictions. At the same time,
Congress eliminated -the federal district court's trial jurisdiction over local
civil matters70 and reduced its trial jurisdiction over local criminal offenses
to prosecutions involving a federal offense. 71 Additionally, the appellate juris-
diction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit over judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with minor
exceptions, was eliminated,7 2 and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
was declared to be the highest court of the District of Columbia, whose judg-
ments are reviewable only by the United States Supreme Court.73 This statu-
tory scheme would seem to adequately meet Congress's objective, and neither
the Act nor its history clearly show an intent to go beyond this basic scheme.
IV. A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
How, then, should section 23-110 of the Act be read? It should be inter-
preted as merely creating a motion procedure whereby a person convicted
in Superior Court may collaterally and subsequently challenge his sen-
tence; it is a procedure in the nature of the ancient writ coram nobis and
66. S. REP. No. 91-405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969).
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-901 (1973).
68. Id. § 11-923.
69. Id. § 11-921.
70. Id. § 11-501.
71. Id. § 11-502.
72. Id. § 11-301.
73. Id. § 11-102.
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it is consistent with state procedures for postconviction review after direct re-
view. The motion procedure should be deemed inadequate and ineffective
within the meaning of section 23-110 when the habeas corpus -petitioner al-
leges facts and a constitutional claim which, if proved, would entitle him to
relief and relief has not been granted by the local courts. A distinction could
be drawn between cases where the petitioner failed to make a motion in
Superior Court and those cases where the motion was made but denied since,
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 and habeas corpus common law, the peti-
tioner would be required to exhaust his local remedies. 74 There is, however,
a readymade 'body of federal law defining when a petitioner has exhausted
his state remedies for habeas corpus purposes.7 5 It is normally unnecessary
for a prisoner to ask his local courts for collateral relief based on the same
evidence and issues already decided on direct review.76  Nor should the peti-
tioner .be denied -the right to petition for habeas corpus where the local pro-
cedure is inexhaustible.7 7  The other side is that the district judge may in
his discretion deny relief to a prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the
orderly procedure in his local court for vindicating federal claims and 'by so
doing has forfeited his local remedies .7  The Supreme Court has made it
clear that this is not an invitation to inject fictions into our habeas corpus
law. "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege; ' 79 whether there has been an intelligent waiver
of a constitutional claim depends on the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the background, experience and conduct of the petitioner.80
V. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that under our constitutional scheme article III courts
have primary responsibility for protection of our constitutional rights. Every-
one should have at least one opportunity to air his constitutional claim before
an article III court.81 But, even in those cases in which certiorari is granted
74. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951); Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245, 247
(1913); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886).
75. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 11, at 1093-
1112.
76. See Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 447 (1953).
77. See United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1952); Ek-
berg v. McGee, 191 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1951)4
78. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
79. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
80. See 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 173 (1971).
81. See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 312-40 (1953).
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on direct review, the remedy is inadequate because the functions of direct
review and habeas corpus are so different8 2 that it may very well take an
evidentiary hearing to assess the constitutional claims. The legislative history
of section 23-110 shows no reason or intent to deprive residents of the Dis-
trict of their right to habeas corpus-a right enjoyed by all other persons in
our country. Before we impute to Congress the intent to bring such a funda-
mental change to our habeas corpus law, clearer language and legislative
'history should be required. The interpretation which this article suggests
gives the local courts all of the legitimate collateral review power that they
need. To read the statute to severely restrict 'habeas corpus in the District
would be insulting to both District of Columbia residents and to the local
courts. Equally important, it would impute to Congress a sinister intent
wholly at odds with the evidence at hand and its constitutional role.
82. See Hart, supra note 52, at 120.
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